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Previous discussions 1 of proposed intervention into the conversion activity
of religious cults begin with considerations of harm 2 and voluntariness. 3 In-
tervention 4 is justified, proponents argue, because the practices that cults
utilize are damaging to the physical and mental health of converts, reduce
autonomy, and threaten such social institutions as the family. 5 Moreover,
these advocates assert, intervention does not conflict with notions of liberty
and freedom of judgment, because the individuals harmed are young persons
who are not fully informed and whose decisionmaking abilities are impaired by
peer pressure, isolation, sleep and dietary deprivation, and manipulation of
guilt and anxiety.6 Those who counsel intervention argue that it is possible to
"draw the line" between the more extreme forms of thought control practiced
by cults and those practiced by military school, Jesuit seminaries, and televi-
sion advertising.
7
The opponents of intervention argue, however, that cultist conversion
practices do not harm the convert, they are undergone willingly and freely, and
they do not differ significantly from those of other social institutions or
1. See, e.g., Delgado, Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion Under the First
Amendment, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Religious Totalism]; NEW YORK
ATTORNEY GENERAL, FINAL REPORT ON THE AcTIvrIEs OF THE CHILDREN OF GOD
(1974); California Sen. Select Conun. on Children & Youth: Hearings on the Impact of Cudts on
Today's Youth (1974); Hearings, Vermont Sen. Comm. for fhe Investigation of Allegcd Decep-
tive, Fraudulent and Criminal Practices of Various Organizations in the State (Aug. 18, 1976).
2. Although religious belief is protected absolutely, religiously motivated conduct, includ-
ing proselytizing, is subject to a balancing test in which the state interests in regulating or
forbidding the activity are weighed against the interest of the religious group or individual in
carrying it out. In the case of cult conversion activity, the state's interests lie in abating the
various harms that ae alleged to result from it.
3. See Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 49-61. Our legal and moral system is reluctant
to designate something as a "harm" when the individual suffering it either does not see it as a
harm, or accepts his situation freely and voluntarily. Thus, if it could be shovn that a cult
member consents to the conversion process, the harms resulting from the process would be
given substantially less weight in the constitutional equation.
4. Proposed intervention could take the form of compelled disclosure, mandatory "cooling
off" periods, procedures to request rescue, prohibitions against licensure of behavior-modifying
techniques, public education, and conservatorships. See Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at
73-78, 88-91.
5. Id. at 10-35.
6. Id. at 49-62.
7. Id. at 62-73.
51
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groups. These opponents assert that any determination that an individual suf-
fers from mind control must be made under strict and clearly defined stan-
dards; an individual must be "demonstrably deprived of his 'own' mind by
specific techniques of involuntary coercion" 8 before intervention can occur.
Both sides of the debate therefore use the terminology of harm, voluntariness,
and line-drawing. In this article I propose a new way of looking at the cult
controversy, and a new set of terms for analyzing the issues raised by cultist
thought reform. As one who has come to believe that cult practices deserve
greater public scrutiny than they have so far received, I shall proceed from a
viewpoint that is largely pro-intervention. 9
My thesis is that looking at religious totalism in terms of slavery can help
illuminate some of the difficult conceptual and legal problems it poses and,
possibly, show the way to a practical solution. The argument has two variants.
The first asserts that the rigidly hierarchical, authoritarian, and isolated living
arrangements established, by certain religious cults with the aid of intensive
thought manipulation techniques, contravene the thirteenth amendment. 10 A
second, more limited variant, asserts that these arrangements, if not themselves
constituting slavery and involuntary servitude, nevertheless violate a number of
values protected by the thirteenth amendment, giving rise to a compelling state
interest in their abatement." Since the present inquiry is a highly tentative
and preliminary one, I shall not differentiate between these two theses but
instead shall address those features of cult life that trigger thirteenth amend-
ment concerns generally.
8. Comment, "Mind Control" or Intensity of Faith: The Constitutional Protection of Re-
ligious Beliefs, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 751, 796 (1978). See also Note, Conservatorships
and Religious Cults: Divining a Theory of Free Exercise, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1247 (1978).
9. The same argument could be used by those opposing deprogramming. Cult defenders
have argued, for example, that deprogramming, which is aimed at restoring a cultist to his
original condition and restoring freedom of choice, is really a kind of "reverse brainwashing."
See A.C.L.U. CONFERENCE ON RELIGIOUS DEPROGRAMMING, DEPROGRAMMING: Docu-
MENTING THE ISSUE 5-8 (1977); Editorial, Deprogramming and Religious Liberty, 29
CHURCH & STATE 212 (1977). These persons would be likely to see parallels to slavery in
some of the remedies proposed, especially forcible deprogramming, which pro-cult writers por-
tray in terms of liberation or treatment.
10. United States v. Carr, No. CR-79-195-D (M.D.N.C., filed Oct. 31, 1979). Three mem-
bers of the Church of God and True Holiness were charged with holding church members in a
state of slavery. Among the accusations were claims that defendant church leaders beat and whipped
members, forced persons to marry each other against their will, told congregation members
where to work and then took their paychecks, ordered members to live in certain cities, and
withheld food and water as punishment. Religious and psychological pressures were among the
means used to induce compliance. See Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367 (D.R.I.
1978), aff'd, 602 F.2d 458 (Ist Cir. 1979) (holding that "the free exercise clause of the first
amendment does not immunize the defendants [religious cult leaders] from causes of action that
allege involuntary servitude or intentional tortious activity," id. at 371, but nevertheless finding
no private cause of action under the theories advanced).
11. Compare Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 10-36 (discussing other social interests in
regulating religiously motivated conversion activity).
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First, I discuss a number of the advantages, both doctrinal and practical,
that a thirteenth amendment analysis can offer. 12  Next I review the case law
relating to slavery and peonage in an effort to identify points of similarity and
difference between the fact patterns of existing cases and those presented by
religious cults. 13 Finding the results inconclusive, I then identify four values
fundamental to the thirteenth amendment and its implementing legislation and
explore the extent to which the conditions established by cult groups offend
these values. 14 Finally, I review the remedies that are available if we con-
clude that in a given case religious totalism constitutes slavery. 15
11
ADVANTAGES OF A THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
The first and perhaps foremost advantage of a thirteenth amendment
analysis over a more conventional harm-voluntariness approach is that the in-
junction against involuntary servitude is categorical. a6 The thirteenth amend-
ment states that "slavery .... except as punishment for crime ... , shall
[not] exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdic-
tion." 1 7 Court opinions have interpreted these words to imply an absolute
prohibition; if a particular practice constitutes slavery, it is prohibited.18 This
12. See text accompanying notes 16-38 ifra.
13. See text accompanying notes 39-80 infra.
14. See text accompanying notes 81-99 infra.
15. See text accompanying notes 100-126 infra.
16. See Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367, 371-72 (D.R.I. 1978):
[T]he free exercise clause of the first amendment does not immunize the defendants from
causes of action that allege involuntary servitude .... The alleged involuntary servitude
is unquestionably an act which has a serious adverse effect upon one of the Church's
followers and constitutes conduct that violates the most fundamental tenets of both Ameri-
can society and the United States Constitution. The Unification Church cannot seek the
protection of one constitutional amendment while it allegedly deprives citizens the protec-
tion of other constitutional guarantees.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
18. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 411-43 n.78 (1968); United
States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914); United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 485 (2d Cir.
1964). The thirteenth amendment has a narrow scope; not every act that limits personal freedom
constitutes slavery. Misner & Clough, Arrestees as Informants: A Thirteenth Amendment
Analysis, 29 STAN. L. REV. 713, 717-24 (1977). See also Robertson v. Baldwin. 165 U.S.
275, 282 (1897) where the Court held that the thirteenth amendment is "not intended to intro-
duce any novel doctrine with respect to certain descriptions of service which have always been
treated as exceptional" (in this case seamen's contracts), but the Court made it clear that public
and private services which have traditionally been accepted are not to be included within the
amendment's scope. But see Weidenfeller v. Kidulis, 380 F. Supp. 445. 450 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
which seemed to imply that a compelling state interest might justify state-imposed involuntary
servitude.' Weidenfeller is contrary to the weight of authority, however, and the better view is
that the thirteenth amendment remains categorical. Cases where thirteenth amendment challenges
failed can be better explained by finding that the practice in question did not fall within the
scope of the amendment at all. See, e.g., Selective Draft Law Cases. 245 U.S. 366. 390 (1918)
(summarily rejecting claim that the draft constitutes slavery); Butler v. Perry. 240 U.S. 328. 333
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feature of the thirteenth amendment is helpful because it avoids the need to
carry out the tenuous and often tortured interest-balancing that is required
under a more conventional analysis. Under the conventional approach, the free
exercise right of the proselytizer is weighed against the interest of the state in
averting harm to the proselyte and to society.19 Although landmark cases
such as Leary v. United States ,20 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 21 Reynolds v. United
States,'2 2 and Jacobson v. Massachusetts,2 3 may serve as benchmarks in reach-
ing a particular decision, the balancing and case comparison may be difficult
and the result far from obvious.2 4  If cultist conversion techniques can be
characterized as enslavement, engagement in these difficult comparisons can be
avoided.
A further advantage of a slavery analysis is that it avoids the issue of
initial voluntariness. 25  At the time of initial contact with the cult, the incip-
ient cultist has little, if any, knowledge of the cult's identity and the future it
holds for him. 26  Most recruiters deliberately withhold such information, invit-
ing the young person to attend what is described only as a gathering of a group
of friends.2 7  At this time, the target person's capacity for decisionmaking is
relatively intact; what is lacking is information on which to base a choice.2 8
After conditioning has proceeded for a few weeks or months, the individual is
given some knowledge of the organization and the demands it will place on
him, but his capacity to make decisions has been so reduced by isolation, sleep
deprivation, dietary inadequacy, chanting, singing, and guilt manipulation that
he is unable to bring an intact mind to bear on the decision. 29
(1916) (statute requiring every able-bodied man to work on country roads for six days each year
does not constitute slavery); Heflin v. Sanford, 142 F.2d 798, 799 (5th Cir. 1944) (compulsory
service for conscientious objectors does not fall within scope of thirteenth amendment).
19. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963); Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 10-49.
20. 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967) (religiously motivated drug use), rev'd on other grounds,
395 U.S. 6 (1969).
21. 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (religiously motivated refusal to send children to public school).
22. 98 U.S. 145, 165-66 (1878) (protection of monogamous marriage as an institution).
23. 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (religiously motivated refusal to receive a vaccination).
24. See Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 10-36 (attempting to assess harms attributed to
cultist thought reform practices).
25. I assume that our society would not tolerate slavery even if it could be shown that the
slaves originally assented to their condition. See State v. Oliva, 144 La. 51, 52-53, 80 So. 195,
196 (1918) ("It matters not that the service was begun voluntarily .... for, if it is enforceable
by criminal prosecution ... it is nevertheless peonage"); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219,
242 (1911); In re Peonage Charge, 138 F. 686, 687 (N.D. Fla. 1905); Peonage Cases, 123 F.
671, 680 (M.D. Ala. 1903); In re Thompson, 117 Mo. 83, 90, 22 S.W. 863, 864 (1893).
Slavery, like suicide, is too final, too irreversible, too inconsistent with our views of personhood
and human dignity to be allowed to exist. J. S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 157-58 (A. Lindsay ed.
1971). See also J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 158-60, 325-33 (1971).
26. See Religious Totalism, supra note I, at 54-55.
27. Id. at 52-53.
28. Id. at 52-56.
29. Id. at 54-56.
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In most other contexts, voluntariness is judged in terms of the dual
requirements of knowledge and capacity. 30 Cults maintain the two essential
elements of an informed decision in inverse proportion, however: when capac-
ity is high, knowledge is low, and when knowledge is high, capacity is
low.3' Deciding whether such impaired assent is valid is extremely difficult.
Thus, an analysis which entirely avoids the issue of voluntariness should be
highly welcome.
A third advantage of a thirteenth amendment approach is that it avoids
reliance on the medical model that earlier analyses of the cult problem have
found undesirable or unreliable. 32 No longer is it necessary to introduce med-
ical testimony to show that cultists are underfed, overworked, diseased, drugged,
or exhausted. It is unnecessary to compare the health threats raised by
cults to those presented in classic court cases dealing with blood transfusions,
refusals of vaccination, ritual ingestion of psychedelic substances, and snake
handling.33 Furthermore, there is no need to rely on psychiatric expertise to
prove incapacity or a need for conservatorship. 34 To demonstrate slave camp
conditions, one need not show that the slaves are unhealthy, incompetent, or in
danger of becoming insane; it is enough to show that they are slaves.
Finally, a thirteenth amendment approach avoids certain problems pre-
sented by any attempt to regulate thought- and behavior-altering practices.3 5
It seems quite possible that, as cultist brainwashing becomes increasingly
sophisticated, it will enable the manipulator to gain effective control of the
minds of young members without causing serious and observable disease, or
resorting to legally suspect modalities such as drugs, physical threats, or re-
moval to isolated settings.A6 Even if a particular group were suspected of
engaging in such extreme practices, the problems of proof might be formid-
able. Due to their indoctrination, members might lie about their own con-
version process, or see obvious violations of their own autonomy as minor
transgressions necessary to enable them to achieve enlightenment.37 Members
who have left the group or undergone deprogramming can be written off as
malcontents, misfits, or as products of the deprogrammer's own brand of
30. Id. at 54.
31. Id.
32. E.g., Szasz, Pat , Hearst's Conversion: Some Call it Brainitashing. THE NEW RE-
PUBLIC, March 6, 1976, at 10-12; Reich, Brainwashing, Psychiatry & the Laiv, 39 PSYCH. 400
(1976).
33. Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 10-36.
34. See id. at 15-16, 88-91.
35. See generally Delgado, Organically Induced Behavioral Change in Correctional Insti-
tutions: Release Decisions aizd the "Nenr Man" Phenomenon, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 215, 251-54
(1977); Delgado, Ascription of Criminal States of Mind. Toward a Defense Theory for the
Coercively Persuaded ("Brainwashed") Defendant, 63 MINN. L. REv. 1, 11-17 (1978).
36. See Maya & Achtenberg, Behavior Modification: Legal Linmitations on Methods and
Goals, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 230 (1974).
37. See, e.g., Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 57-62.
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brainwashing. A thirteenth amendment analysis avoids all this. It does not
matter that the slave believes in or praises his or her own enslavement, 8 or
sees it as essential to his or her spiritual well-being. Nor is it necessary to
demonstrate that slavery arose through legally suspect means; it is the end
result alone that counts. A thirteenth amendment analysis, then, can avoid
many of the difficulties and pitfalls of earlier, more conventional approaches. I




IN THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT TERMS
A. Cult Practices and Thirteenth Amendment Case Law
The thirteenth amendment, initially aimed at eliminating the evils of Afri-
can slavery, has been extended by judicial interpretation to encompass any
"condition of enforced compulsory service of one to another." 39 It reaches
"every race and every individual .... Slavery or involuntary servitude of the
Chinese, of the Italian, of the Anglo-Saxon, are as much within its compass as
slavery . . . of the African." 40 It covers "those forms of compulsory labor
akin to African slavery which, in practical operation, would tend to produce
like undesirable results." 41 Bondage produced by physical force clearly qual-
ifies, 42 as does bondage induced by debt, terror, or confinement. 43
38. Compare Elkins, Slavery and Negro Personality in AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY 234
(A. Weinstein & F. Gatell eds. 1968) (phenomenon of the "happy slave") with GROUP FOR
THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, SYMPOSIUM No. 3: FACTORS USED TO INCREASE
THE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF INDIVIDUALS TO FORCEFUL INDOCTRINATION: OBSERVATIONS
AND EXPERIMENTS (1956) (psychological study of the American POW experience).
39. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16 (1906), overruled in part, Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); See United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165, 1167 (5th Cir.
1977) ("the law takes no account of the means of coercion") cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1007
(1978). Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 17 (1906). See also Tyler v. Heidorn, 46 Barb.
439, 458 (N.Y. App. Div. 1866) (slavery is "that which gives to one person the control and
ownership of the involuntary and compulsory services of another against his will and consent").
Slavery was not found to be present where the restriction on liberty was either minimal or of
long standing; Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916) (public works on roads and bridges);
Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897) (seaman's contract); United States v. Crocker, 420
F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1970) (the draft); Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36 (1874) (school attendance in a
segregated school); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966) (assigning an attorney to
represent an indigent).
41. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916); see United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d
475 (2d Cir. 1964). See also L.A. Times, Jan. 8, 1980, § 1, at 2, col. 3 (federal anti-slavery
prosecution of farm foreman for keeping Mexican aliens in state of "slavery peonage").
42. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916); United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.
1964).
43. United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165, 1167-68 (5th Cir. 1977); Pierce v. United
States, 146 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied 324 U.S. 873 (1945); Bernal v. United States,
241 F. 339 (5th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 672 (1918).
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Peonage statutes, enacted as implementing legislation under the thirteenth
amendment, prohibit compulsory service based upon indebtedness. 44 Aimed
initially at Indian and Mexican peonage in the territory of New Mexico, the
statutes have been interpreted to proscribe all practices that have the effect of
compelling labor on the basis of an obligation asserted by the master.45 The
obligation need not be monetary, but can arise from any debt, real or im-
agined, used to generate an obligation to work. 46  Both antislavery and
antipeonage provisions reach private as well as state action.47
United States v. Ingalls 48 illustrates the scope courts have given the pro-
hibitions against slavery and peonage. In Ingalls, a Negro domestic was for-
bidden to leave the house of the master, forced to do menial work, denied the
right to have friends, given an inadequate diet, and provided no com-
pensation. 49  She was forced, under threat of punishment, to remain in her
master's house and told that if she left she would be confined in a prison or
mental institution. 50  By such means, the master had been able to reduce her
to a condition of complete subjugation. 51 The court held that her treatment
amounted to involuntary servitude in violation of federal antislavery legisla-
tion. 5
2
In United States v. Bibbs,53 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a
conviction of several Florida farm owners and labor contractors for maintaining
field hands in a condition of slavery. The defendants had threatened the work-
ers with extreme punishment if they left the camp. They were required to
purchase food and to rent farm housing from the defendants at exorbitant
prices, and were told they could not leave until their debts were paid. The
court held that the defendants' course of conduct constituted "incidents of
slavery" prohibited by the thirteenth amendment and federal involuntary ser-
vitude statutes. 54  The court also held that the means used to maintain the
field hands in a state of bondage satisfied the coercion requirement.55 Even
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976); 18 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1976); Clyatt v. United States. 197
U.S. 207 (1905).
45. Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671 (M.D. Ala. 1903).
46. Id. at 680.
47. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207
(1905); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Salt Lake City v. Tax Comm'n, 11 Utah 2d
359, 359 P.2d 397 (1961).
48. 73 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
49. Id. at 77.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 78.
52. The court defined a slave as "a person who is wholly subject to the will of another, one
who has no freedom of action but whose person and services are wholly under the control of
another." Id. His condition is that of "entire subjection ... to the will of another," he is "one
who has lost the power of resistance." Id. at 79.
53. 564 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1977).
54. Id. at 1167-68 (construing 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (1976)).
55. Id.
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though the workers had not availed themselves of opportunities to escape, de-
fendants were not relieved of liability, since they had made the workers fearful
of the consequences of escape.
56
Many features of cult life resemble those that violate laws relating to
slavery and peonage. Cultists often are recruited by force and deception, then
removed to isolated surroundings from which escape is difficult or impossi-
ble. 7  While conditioning is carried out, the member may be denied access to
a telephone, forbidden to leave the camp, or denied any opportunity for rest or
reflection.-"8 In many cases, he or she is required to engage in nonstop chant-
ing, recitation, and prayer, interspersed with lectures and "struggle sessions,"
all accompanied by an unceasing sensory barrage.59 The recruit may be de-
nied adequate sleep and fed a diet deficient in protein and vitamins.60 Those
who express a desire to leave are subjected to intense psychological pressure,
or even physical force.61 Locked gates or barbed wire may make leaving dif-
ficult. 62  Camps are commonly located in the remote countryside, or on an
island where escape is almost impossible. 63 Doubts, "improper" thoughts, or
insufficient fund-raising may be punished by forcing the recruit to "pay
indemnity" and undergo physical self-mortification.
6 4
After weeks or months of conditioning, the new member's mental state is
narrowed to such an extent that some psychiatrists describe it as a form of
trance. 65 Once in this condition, the victim is compelled to reorganize his or
her thoughts and relationships into simplistic patterns of right and wrong, good
and evil. 66 Memories of his past life begin to fade; all that is real is the
present, with its intense preoccupation with frightening problems of the super-
natural and cosmic struggles between the forces of good and evil.6 7 Language
and thought patterns change. Speech becomes literal, magical, and task-
oriented. Independent critical thinking is discouraged; the convert is taught to
obey. 68
In time, the convert is deemed ready to function outside the confines of
the camp. In the company of more experienced cult members, he or she begins
outside work, which may take the form of raising funds on street corners,
scavenging for edible garbage, or working in a cult-operated shop or busi-
ness.619 Work assignments are made by the leaders, who control every detail
56. Id. at 1168.
57. Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 50-53.
58. Id. at 40-41.
59. Id. at 11-16.
60. Id. at 19.
61. Id. at 50-52.
62. Id. at 40-41, 50-51.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 17, 19-20.
65. Id. at 13.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 14.
68. Id. at 14-15.
69. Id. at 14.
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of the convert's life, including residence, meals, hours of sleep, even choice of
marital partner.7 0  The convert is required to donate all worldly possessions to
the leader.7 1  Recruits work 12- 14-hour work days, seven days a week.
72
All the proceeds are turned over to the cult leaders; none are retained by the
member, who continues to receive a subsistence diet and barely adequate shel-
ter and clothing.7 3 Although the cultist now moves about in the outside world,
his thought processes have been controlled so that he has no desire to es-
cape.7 4  He has been forcibly taught to believe that the outside world is
dangerous and satanical, that his parents hate him, and that his only chance for
salvation lies with the group.7 5 Many are taught to chant inwardly to shut out
distracting stimuli, such as bystanders who might try to argue with them. 76
They show no interest in newspapers, magazines, or world events.7 7  Parents
and friends who have known these individuals in their previous lives are
shocked at the changes they observe: abandonment of previous goals, robot-
like behavior, repetitive speech patterns, physical changes, and a fixed, un-
changing facial expression.
78
B. Cult Practices and Thirteenth Amendment Policies
It appears, then, that many features of cult life resemble peonage or in-
voluntary servitude. The fit is not perfect, however, and assertions must be
made cautiously. No court, for example, has considered whether forced
internalization of supernatural fears or threats would constitute an imper-
missible means of induction into a cult,79 nor whether the servitude imposed
70. Id. at 44-47. In much the same way, slaves' lives were controlled by their masters. See
generally Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883) (slavery entailed restraint of movements,
inability to hold property, to make contracts, to have access to courts); Hall v. United States, 92
U.S. 27, 30 (1875) (slavery entails inability to enter into any contract, including a marriage
contract).
71. Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 44-45.
72. Id. at 45.
73. Id. at 19, 45.
74. Id. at 14, 21-25; see United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165, 1168 (5th Cir. 1977)
(failure to escape when opportunity to do so presented itself held not an indication of voluntari-
ness).
75. Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 13-14, 16-17, 26-28, 31-33.
76. Interview with John Clark, M.D., Professor of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School, in
Washington, D.C. (June 1978). See Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 21-23.
77. Interview with John Clark, M.D., supra note 76.
78. Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 14, 22.
79. Although the forbidden means of induction into voluntary servitude are broadly defined,
e.g., United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165, 1167-68 (5th Cir. 1977). the precise scope of
forbidden means has never been stated, Misner & Clough, Arrestees as Informants: A Thirteenth
Amendment Analysis, 29 STAN. L. REv. 713, 717-19 (1977). nor have courts squarely ruled on
conditions that would render physical compulsion unnecessary where the victim's mechanisms of
choice have been rendered nonfunctional. See Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir.
1944) ("the law takes no account of ... the means and method of coercion"); United States v.
Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 486 (2d Cir. 1964) (action by a master which causes a victim to
believe that he has no way to avoid continued service would constitute involuntary servitude)
(dictum); id. at 487 (Dimock, J., concurring) (subjugation of the will sufficient cause for finding
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by cults would constitute the requisite degree of bondage. 80 Until actual cases
are brought, these must be considered open questions. When these questions
are ultimately presented to the courts, decisions will be rendered in light of the
policies that underlie the constitutional prohibitions against slavery and bond-
age. These policies include:
(1) Prevention of the degradation of the human personality likely to
result if persons are treated like items of property;
(2) Prevention of the slave's misery and suffering;
(3) Prevention of the corruption of the master as the result of his
unnatural control over other human beings; and
(4) Prevention of social stagnation resulting from the institution of
slavery itself.
The first policy, prevention of the degradation of the human personality,
lies at the very core of our rejection of slavery. This policy is based on notions
of respect for the human personality, a consideration which goes beyond sim-
ple concern for the physical well-being of the slave. Slavery offends the dig-
nity of the individual, a deeply held value. 81  Thus, even if it were to appear
that tolerating slavery served utilitarian purposes, or was imposed only by be-
nign and considerate masters, society would still not permit it.
8 2
involuntary servitude and particular means used to effect subjugation not significant); Turner v.
Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367, 375-76 (D.R.I. 1978) ("It is unclear whether [ 18 U.S.C.]
section 1583 should be expanded to include the type of involuntary servitude alleged in this
case, namely servitude ... based upon psychological control or dominance . . .") (dictum).
Other courts state that only a showing of "compulsion" will satisfy the requirements of
illegitimate bondage. Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d
264 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'd 407 U.S. 258 (1972). These results may have been different, how-
ever, had the possibility of more sophisticated psychological means of effecting the same result
been before the court. See also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438 (1967)
(Congress has power under the thirteenth amendment to eradicate conditions of servitude); United
States v. Clement, 171 F. 974, 976 (D.S.C. 1909) ("What constitutes force or intimidation
is a question of fact, and each case must depend upon its own circumstances. The character and
condition of life of the two parties are always to be considered . . ."). These dicta seem to
leave open the possibility of finding that paralysis of the will induced by psychological means
and resulting in complete domination of the victim by another would qualify as slavery.
80. The bondage requirement demands that labor of some sort be performed for the primary
benefit of the master rather than for that of the servant. Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 131-32
(2d Cir. 1966) (inmates at mental institution could be compelled to work since the labor was
"therapeutic," and hence for their own benefit). Cult leaders would, no doubt, assert that the
labor of the followers was exacted for the benefit of God, or of some other spiritual entity
or value, rather than for that of the leaders personally. These leaders, however, are almost
invariably very wealthy men. See Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 44-45.
81. T. JEFFERSON, Notes on Virginia, Query XVIIl, in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 60-61 (E. Dumbauld ed. 1955) (slavery "transforms those into despots
and these into enemies, destroys the morals of the one part and the amor patriae of the other.
S.. Indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just .... "); CONG. GLOBE,
38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1321 (1864) (slavery opposed because it degrades the slave).
82. See Hare, What is Wrong with Slavery, 8 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 103 (1979); J. RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 158-60, 325-33 (1971).
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Of the four interests, the interest in preventing debasement of the human
personality most clearly justifies intervention. The thought of the People's
Temple members, trained to perfect obedience, who followed their leader to
their deaths, 83 or that of the glassy-eyed, weary street comer cultist, prepared
to solicit yet another donation in the name of a nonexistent charity, fills us
with a wonder approaching dread. Is the human personality so malleable? The
thirteenth amendment's prohibition of human bondage offers a method by
which our instinctive reaction to such cases can be made legally cognizable.
Our intuitions should respond to fundamental notions about the way in which
we, as a society, wish to live. We do not want slavery.
The second interest is that of preventing the infliction of suffering and
misery upon the slave. Although cult leaders may live in palaces, own yachts,
and have an army of servants and chauffeurs to do their work,8 4 the rank and
file live in wretched conditions, suffering from crowded, unsanitary living ar-
rangements, little or no medical care, inadequate diet and sleep, and tormented
by deliberately inculcated guilt and fears.A
5
By ordinary standards these people are leading lives of misery. The diffi-
culty, of course, is that if approached while still with the group, they will
declare that they are happy, that their bodies are of no concern to them, and
that they must make sacrifices in order to advance the group's spiritual and
worldly missions.8 6 Interviews with ex-members, however, reveal that they
recall their former lives as sustained torment, from which they are thankful to
have escaped.8 7  It is intuitively sounder to judge the conditions within these
groups from the perspective of the outsider rather than that of the "happy
slave." By our standards, and by those of ex-cult members, rank and file cult
members live lives of misery and deprivation. The ameliorative thrust of thir-
teenth amendment analysis dictates that we provide some form of relief for
their condition.
The third interest is that of preventing the corruption of the master which
results from his all-encompassing control over the slaves. Power corrupts, and
power over persons corrupts most completely of all.8 8  The career of Jim
Jones is a ready illustration of this corrosive force;" " other cult leaders evi-
83. NEWSWEEK, Dec. 4, 1978, at 38.
84. Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 44-45.
85. Id. at 19-21, 31.
86. Id. at 57-62.
87. Id. at 58 n.309, 79-81.
88. See generally W. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE NEGRO 1550-1812 (1968); AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY: A MODERN READER 135-212.
221-328 (A. Weinstein & F. Gatell eds. 1968); J.S. MILL. REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
198 (A. Lindsay ed. 1971) ("slavery is. in all its details ... corrupting to the master
class .... ").
89. See The Assassination of Representative Leo J. Ryan and the Jonestown. GuYana
Tragedy: Report of a Staff Investigative Group to the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs. 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); West & Delgado, Psyching out the Cult's Collective Mania. L.A.
Times. Nov. 26, 1978, Part VII, at 1. col. 1.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
1980-1981]
REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE
dence a similar loss of judgment and growing megalomania 0  Psychiatrists
and psychohistorians who have studied the rise of Hitlerism and other totalistic
movements find these developments alarming; "I further tragedies, spawned by
megalomaniacal leaders confident of the instant obedience of their followers,
seem possible.
The final interest is that of preventing the social stagnation which results
from slavery. 2  In terms of the present controversy, this interest translates
into a concern over cults' refusal to interact with society, 93 except for certain
limited, ritualized purposes: panhandling, recruiting new members, and obtain-
ing food, money, and clothing from parents and merchants. 94  Diversity is lost
within the group, through indoctrination practices and the well-known
phenomenon of "identification with the aggressor."95 Cultists are not open
to change on a religious, or any other, level. 1 6  Few leave voluntarily. 7  The
90. Id.; see also Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 25 & n.152. What accounts for this
phenomenon is not clear. Perhaps it is natural selection; cult leaders often are power-hungry
individuals whose grandiose tendencies are accentuated by the experience of controlling others,
Or, it may be that leadership roles involving total power exacerbate traits of rigidity and au-
thoritarianism. In Freudian terms, the leaders may tend toward unbalance because they repre.
sent, in exaggerated form, the superego function of the group, without adequate controls.
91. E.g., Transcript, National Ad Hoc Committee, The Uniflcation Church: Its Activities
and Practices (April 20, 1976) ("Dole-Buckley Hearings"), pt. 1, at 40 (testimony of Rabbi
Maurice Davis, Professor of Psychology). See also sources cited in notes 89 & 90 supra.
92. A society based on slavery is relieved of the necessity of fending for itself, of finding
free-market means for seeing to its own survival. Abraham Lincoln stated: "Familiarize your-
selves with the chains of bondage and prepare your limbs to wear them. Accustomed to trample
on the rights of others, you have lost the genius of your own independence . ... " Mendelson,
The Dred Scott Case-Revisited, 7 LA. L. REV. 398, 403 (1947). By contrast, Andrew Johnson
stated: "Slavery was essentially a monopoly of labor, and as such locked the states where it
prevailed against the incoming of free industry .... Monopolies, perpetuities, and class legisla-
tion are contrary to the genius of free government, and ought not to be allowed .... [T]he
principle of our Government is that of equal laws and freedom of industry." 6 J. RICHARDSON,
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3559 (1897) (Andrew Johnson, First Annual
Message to Congress, Dec. 4, 1865).
Other commentators have argued that society should not tolerate slavery because the nation
is no freer than its least free member. See generally J.S. MILL, The Subjection of Women, in
ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 311 (MacMillan Co. ed. 1926) (n.p. 1st ed. 1869) ("[Ev-
ery restraint on the freedom of conduct of any of their human fellow creatures . . dries up pro
tanto the principal fountain of human happiness, and leaves the species less rich, to an inapprc-
ciable degree, in all that makes life valuable to the individual human being.") See also tenBrock,
Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 171, 180
(1951) (the thirteenth amendment "was meant to be a direct ban against many of the evils
radiating out from the system of slavery as well as a prohibition of the system itself").
93. "[A slave] stood upon the face of the earth completely isolated from the society in
which he happened to be; he was nothing but a chattel .... CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 503-04 (1866) (Sen. Jacob M. Howard).
94. See West & Delgado, Psyching out the Cult's Collective Mania, L.A. Times, Nov. 26,
1978, Part VII, at 1, col. 1.
95. Id.; Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 13-15, 17, 21-25.
96. West & Delgado, supra note 94, at 1, col. I; see Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 48.
97. Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 81-82, 90.
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leaders are probably even more inaccessible. This state of affairs is in-
consistent with the idea of a society committed to pluralism and the mar-
ketplace of ideas, 98 not to mention a view of religion as an exercise of free-
dom of the mind. 99
IV
REMEDIES
An express finding that conditions within a religious society constitute
involuntary servitude would support criminal prosecutions under the thirteenth
amendment's implementing statutes. 100 If needed, Congress could enact a stat-
ute addressed specifically to the conditions found to prevail in cult environ-
ments. 10 1 Private actions for damages or injunctive relief could be brought,
either as an implied action under an implementing statute,' 02 or as a tort action
for unlawful imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
103
A finding that cult social arrangements violated any of the interests pro-
tected by the thirteenth amendment would give rise to a compelling state in-
terest that would support narrowly tailored' 0 4 remedial action.105 States
could require, for example, that religious proselytizers disclose, at a time
98. See sources cited in notes 92-96 supra.
99. For a description of Jefferson's view, see D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE RIGHTS
OF MAN 110 (1951); T. JEFFERSON, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 2 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 545 (J. Boyd ed. 1950) ("Almighty God hath created the
mind free, and manifested his supreme will that free it shall remain .... ).
100. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581, 1583, 1584 (1976) (providing criminal penalties for persons
responsible for states of peonage or slavery); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1976) (declaring void
acts, regulations, or "usages" which maintain slavery and peonage).
101. See Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 92-95. But see Turner v. Unification Church,
473 F. Supp. 367 (D.R.I. 1978) (finding no private civil cause of action against private defen-
dants for violations of thirteenth amendment and antipeonage legislation; plaintiff remitted to
common law tort remedies, such as unlawful imprisonment and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress).
102. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409 (1968) (private remedies for constitutional wrongs). See also Religious Totalism, supra
note 1, at 92-95. But see Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367 (D.R.I. 1978) (no
private civil cause of action against private defendants for violations of thirteenth amendment
and federal antipeonage legislation; plaintiff remitted to common law tort remedies). If other
courts follow the Turner ruling, Congress could enact legislation providing for civil relief, as it
has done in other areas of great regulatory concern, such as antitrust and civil rights.
103. False or unlawful imprisonment requires that the defendant interfere with plaintiff's
freedom to move about. E.g., W. PROSSER & J. WADE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
43-54 (5th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 35 (1971). Intentional infliction
of emotional distress requires that defendant engage in outrageous conduct causing severe emo-
tional distress to the plaintiff. E.g., W. PROSSER & J. WADE, supra, at 55-74.
104. The remedy must be narrowly tailored to comport with constitutional requirements in
effect when state action trenches on liberty protected by the Constitution-in this case, the first
amendment right of free exercise of religion. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205. 215
(1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
105. See text accompanying notes 2-3 supra; Religious Totalism. supra note 1, at 73-97.
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specified by statute, the identity of the group and also, perhaps, the conditions
of membership. 10 6 Provision could be made for mandatory "cooling off"
periods, or interruptions of the conditioning process, during which the recruit
would be required to leave the group. 10 7 During this time, he or she could
seek advice, think, rest, reconsider his or her situation and decide whether or
not to return to the group for further indoctrination.1 0 8  Both measures would
make it less likely that an individual would unwittingly, or without full consid-
eration, become a member of an organization whose practices might make it
difficult or impossible for him or her to leave voluntarily at a later date.
States could launch programs of research and education, designed to in-
crease the public's understanding of the risks of associating with groups which
practice thought-reform methods and techniques. 10 9 Such efforts would be
similar to existing efforts to deter young children from smoking, drinking,
using drugs, or engaging in irresponsible sexual activity.
Under its general police power, the state might forbid, by means of
clearly drawn statutes, conduct known to present risks of mental harm or
enslavement of others." 0 The arsenal of thought reform technology could
thus be made inaccessible to cult recruiters and others. Alternatively, use of
these techniques could be restricted to individuals trained and licensed in
psychology or behavioral therapy."' 1 Such prohibitory rules are comparable to
106. Such a requirement could be compared to consumer protection, or "truth in merchandis-
ing," rulings and statutes. E.g., Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 87 F.T.C. 421, 516, 524-26,
531 (Mar. 9, 1976) (final order to cease and desist) (salespersons ordered to present to home-
owners, at time of initial contact, 3 x 5 inch card containing name of corporation, name of
salesperson, and statement: "The purpose of this . . . call is to solicit the sale of ency-
clopedias"; corporation found to engage in deceptive sales practices in the past, including repre-
senting that the salesperson's purpose was to conduct a marketing survey or give away books).
107. This remedy would also be similar in effect to consumer protection rules that pennit
consumers to rescind purchase contracts within a specific period if, once free of the salesper-
son's influence they decide they do not want the product. See, e.g., P. KEETON & M. SHAPO,
PRODUCTS AND THE CONSUMER: DECEPTIVE PRACTICES 454-61 (1972); see Sandoval, A
Critical Analysis of the Cooling-Off Period for Door to Door Sales, 3 CHICANo L. REV. 110
(1976).
108. The statute could prohibit contact by the group during this period of time, in order to
minimize the possibility that further pressure would be brought to bear during the cooling-off
period.
109. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1974, at 37, col. I (New York Attorney General Louis
Lefkowitz sees alerting public as one of anticipated benefits of hearings into Children of God
sect).
110. See U. of R.I. Daily, Apr. 14, 1975, at I (reporting student senate vote to deny on-
campus status to Unification Church front group because of danger they pose to autonomy and
well-being of students); Student Ass'n of State U. of N.Y. at Albany, Executive Branch
Memorandum (May 22, 1975) (Moon group denied campus status because, among other
reasons, its practices endanger free choice of students).
111. Violating the provisions of such a statute would be punished as practicing psychology or
psychiatry without a license. See Comment, Standard of Care in Administering Non-Traditional
Psychotherapy, U. CAL. D.L. REV. 56, 77-81 (1974).
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strictures permitting quarantines 112 or to those forbidding religious snake
handling. 113 Regulatory rules could insure that only licensed, knowledgeable,
and presumably humane professionals would tamper with the mental processes
of others.
1 4
Provision could be made for the filing of documents requesting rescue
with an appropriate court or agency. 115 These statements, analogous to the
"living wills" utilized in states having death-with-dignity statutes,1 16 would
recite that the maker does not desire to associate with certain named groups
and desires to be retrieved should he or she find himself or herself ensnared
with such a group.' 17 These documents which would give a court an indica-
tion of the individual's desires at a time when his or her knowledge and capac-
ity were both high, would be entitled to considerable weight in connection
with any request for a court order directing removal.' 18
Finally, conservatorship and guardianship orders could be obtained by rel-
atives, friends, or agencies of the state directing the removal of persons who
have fallen under the domination of cult leaders and whose psychological free-
dom has been demonstrably impaired. 119 That the proposed conservatee or
ward had been reduced to, or was in the process of being reduced to, a condi-
tion of near-servitude would constitute a strong justification for the issuance of
such an order.'
20
112. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 3050-51 (West 1970); MICH. COsP. LAWS
§§ 329.1-.3 (1970) (quarantine statutes for communicable diseases).
113. E.g., State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, 112 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 954 (1976); Harden v. State, 188 Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948).
114. It is not assumed that all professionals will utilize behavior modification technology
humanely. It is only asserted that the likelihood of abuse is smaller when these techniques are
carried out by trained and licensed professionals subject to the scrutiny of their professional
peers and loss of their license for improper treatment.
115. See Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 77.
116. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-95 (West Supp. 1977) (permitting with-
drawal of medical treatment when patient has indicated such a desire in writing).
117. See the model instrument used by anti-cult group, reproduced in Religious Totalism,
supra note 1, at 77 n.389.
118. Some might argue that cult leaders could require that inductees simply rescind such
documents. The very process of rescission, however, would bring the rescinder before a court.
enable the court to question him or her about his or her freedom from coercion and influence.
and provide an element of visibility for cult practices that is presently lacking.
119. See generally AMER. BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW
250-302 (S. Brakel & R. Rock eds. 1971); UNIFORM PROD. CODE § 5-310 (temporary guard-
ianship for period not to exceed six months); 39 CJ.S. Guardian and Ward § 11. at 28
(1976); In re Petri, No. NCP 5267B (L.A. County (Cal.) Super. Ct. Mar. 1. 1976); In re
Coleman, No. 16386 (Mendocino County (Cal.) Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 1975) (conservatorship or-
ders issued for cult members).
120. See cases cited note 119 supra, in which a conservatorship or guardianship was granted
on a showing that the proposed ward of conservatee was being subjected to harmful physical and
psychological influences.
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In addition, the government's power to exclude from its territory indi-
viduals who are likely to engage in criminal or antisocial activity 121 could be
used to prevent the entry of foreign cult leaders whose careers demonstrate a
history of enslavement of others. Although this will do little to ameliorate
existing slavery in this country, it will at least minimize the likelihood that
new forms will be introduced.1
22
In general, the remedy chosen will need to represent the least onerous
alternative available to effectuate the interest in preventing or abating slav-
ery. 123  The remedy will therefore vary according to the stage of the condi-
tioning process at which it is aimed: at early stages mild or preventive rem-
edies should be tried.' 2 4  At later stages, when it appears the conditioning or





The advantages of a thirteenth amendment approach to religious en-
slavement are substantial: the prohibition against slavery is categorical, initial
voluntariness is immaterial, resort to a medical model is unnecessary and end-
states rather than means are emphasized, thereby avoiding the difficulties of
proof which are inevitable when the case rests on means alone. At the same
time, uncertainties are inherent in such an analysis. Few courts have tested
121. E.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (providing categories of excludable aliens); Galvan v. Press,
347 U.S. 522 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Lem Moon Sing v.
United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895) (general power of nation to exclude persons from its bor-
ders). I am indebted to Michael Woodruff, attorney at law, for this suggestion.
122. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27) (consular officers' and Attorney General's power to exclude
persons likely to endanger safety of citizens or engage in activities prejudicial to the public
interest).
123. See Religious Totalism, supra note 1, at 73 (discussion of least-onerous-alternative re-
quirement). The least-onerous-alternative requirement is imposed when state action interferes
with the exercise of a constitutionally protected liberty. Like the "narrow tailoring" requirement
discussed at notes 104-21, supra, this requirement ensures that state regulation of fundamental
liberties not be broader than necessary to effectuate the state's legitimate interest. In the present
context, for example, the requirement would prevent the state from sentencing a cult proselytizer
to a long jail term if it appeared that a simple requirement of disclosure would prevent fraudu-
lent recruitment and subsequent enslavement of a person now in the initial phases of contact
with the religious organization.
124. Examples of mild or preventive remedies are discussed supra notes 106-18. These may
prove effective in the case of persons at the point of first contact with the organization, when
their psychological or physical enslavement has not progressed far.
125. If it should appear that a cult organization has already achieved domination over a group
of individuals, mild or preventive remedies will prove ineffectual. In these cases more forceful
action will be necessary, generally including the physical removal of the victim from the cult
environment; see, e.g., text accompanying notes 119 & 120 (conservatorship and guardianship
remedy).
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thirteenth amendment concerns in religious contexts or have grappled with the
question of control effected by psychological means. In the absence of clear-
cut guidance from the decisional law, courts and legislatures confronted with
this problem will undoubtedly analyze it in terms of the underlying policies of
the thirteenth amendment. In this article, four policies were identified and
found applicable, in varying degrees, to present-day cult practices and condi-
tions. Remedies under the thirteenth amendment can and should be im-
plemented to limit the unique but harmful brand of slavery that cults impose
on their members.
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